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This paper proposes that the resurgence of geographic factors in the study of uneven 
development is not due simply to the recurrent nature of intellectual fashions, nor 
necessarily because arguments that rely on geographic factors are less simplistic than 
before, nor because they avoid racialist, imperialistic, and deterministic forms they 
sometimes took in the past. Rather, this paper argues that geographic factors have 
been turned to once again because they are an indispensable part of explanation, 
playing a special role that has not been properly understood, a role especially crucial 
for the explanation of the inherently spatial questions that development studies seek to 
address.  
The paper is made up of two sections and an appendix. 
The first section discusses why geographic factors are necessary for explanations of 
uneven development with a brief example from the ‘institutions versus geography’ 
debate. The second section discusses why the reflexive rejection by social scientists of 
geographic and environmental factors is misguided, with a separate note on 
geography and geographers.  
The ideas in this paper were in part arrived at inductively while surveying instances 
where social scientists in some way attempt to account for real-world 
locations/distributions of social phenomena (as opposed to discussing a social theory 
or process aspatially or with its distribution taken as a starting point). A number of 
these are included with discussion as an appendix. 
I   Bringing social theory down to earth 
 
There are a number of possible reasons one might conclude are behind the 
resurgence in the use of geographic/environmental factors in development studies. 
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This resurgence, especially among geographers, is frequently viewed extremely 
negatively—as ill-conceived, uninformed, opportunistic,1 even as ominous and 
dangerous (Blaut 2000, Merrett 2003, Sluyter 2003, Coombes and Barber 2005, 
Judkins et. al. 2008, O’Keefe et. al. 2010, Radcliff et. al., 2010). The resurgence could 
be simply due to the recurrent nature of intellectual fashions. Similarly, but more 
ominously, it could be due to underlying persistent ideologies that geographic factors 
are somehow uniquely suited to supporting.2 Alternatively, they might be viewed as 
having become more palatable because in their recent form they are more 
sophisticated and either 1) in their increased sophistication avoid the worst aspects of 
over-simplicity and/or 2) avoid association with deterministic, racist, or imperialistic 
ideologies. 
We believe none of these are the real reason for the resurgence of geographic 
factors in research on uneven development. Rather, modern research, despite vast 
increases in the amount and quality of data, ever more sophisticated theories, and the 
technological means to combine these, has nevertheless hit an insuperable barrier; 
research cannot advance without integrating geographic and environmental factors 
into social science research. This paper explains this view. 
1.1.  Anchoring social theory: Why exogenous spatial factors are necessary 
As economists and others closely involved with international development 
agencies have made clear in recent years, despite many different approaches one 
policy after another has resulted in little economic gain and frequently caused 
                                                 
1 ‘[O]pportunists are able to achieve some renown by reviving environmental determinism as a quick 
and dirty integration of the natural and social sciences’ (Sluyter 2003, 817). David Harvey cites the 
‘banal version of physical geographic determinism (of the sort peddled recently by Jared Diamond 
1997 in Guns Germs and Steel or, on an occasional opportunistic basis, by the economist Jeffrey Sachs, 
with Gallup and Mellinger 1999).’ (Harvey 2011, 12) 
 
2 ‘[T]he essential common ground [between fin de siècle and modern geographic determinists] is in 
the ideological dimension of determinist theorizing: in the fact, in other words, that the argument from 
nature appears always to be deployed toward a recognizably programmatic end’ [Bassin refers to 
Ratzelian Lebensraum, nationalism, and Marxism]. (Bassin 2003, 27, emphasis in the original) 
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negative unintended consequences.3 Continued failure has led to a greatly increased 
openness to factors long ignored as ‘exogenous’ in development theory in the attempt 
to more fully capture the range of variation in factors thought relevant to development 
across the globe. Subsequently, datasets have grown dramatically in scale and scope 
in the past two decades, covering much of the globe and such diverse factors as 
measures of institutions and political systems,4 corruption,5 norms and beliefs,6 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization,7 and geographical factors relevant to development.8 
Additionally, factors thought to have long-term effects on development, such as 
colonial history, historical urbanization and population, migration, disease, and 
historical patterns of trade have also been increasingly quantified in cross-national 
                                                 
3 Making many of these critiques especially forceful is the fact that they come from ‘insiders’ such as  
Joseph Stiglitz’s (2000) ‘What I Learned at the World Economic Crisis’ and William Easterly’s (2001) 
The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, or those 
with otherwise ‘progressive’ views not inherently skeptical of government aid (a predisposition which 
sometimes undermined the force of the arguments of past critics of international aid) such as Maggie 
Black’s (2002) excellent The No-Nonsense Guide to International Development. 
4 E.g., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, (World Bank), Polity IV 
Dataset, (University of Maryland). 
5 E.g., Corruption Perception Index, (Transparency International). 
6 E.g., World Values Survey 1981-2004, (World Values Survey Association). 
7 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Indices, (Roeder, 2001). 
8 Extensive geographical datasets related to development have been especially associated with work 
from the Center for International Development (CID) at Harvard University. Examples include 
Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup (1999) ‘Climate, Water Navigability, and Economic Development’, 
Masters and McMillan (2000) ‘Climate and Scale in Economic Growth’, as well as Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (1998) ‘Geography and Economic Development’, and Masters (2003) ‘Climate, Agriculture 
and Economic Development’, in Land Quality, Agricultural Productivity, and Food Scarcity. 
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datasets.9 However, as ever more social factors such as measures of culture, 
education, ethnic fractionalization, religion and so on are included in development 
studies a paradox becomes evident. If everything is endogenous, how can anything be 
treated as an explanatory independent variable? This problem was recently explicitly 
recognized by the political scientist Adam Przeworski: 
The recent theoretical developments [in development studies] consist of 
endogenizing factors previously considered as exogenous (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2001, Banerjee and Duflo 2003, Benabou 1997, 2000, Benhabib and 
Przeworski 2004, Bourgignon and Verdier 2000, Hoff and Stiglitz 2003, Perotti 
1993, Saint Paul and Verdier 1996): inequality shapes institutions, institutions 
affect redistribution, both institutions and income distribution influence the 
growth of income, while the level of income affects both institutions and 
inequality. Yet if everything is endogenous, identification is impossible: 
everything is simply determined by the initial conditions, which may, in turn, be 
shaped only by geography. (Przeworski 2004, 20-21) 
And indeed, there has been a sharp increase in both studies of uneven development 
that cite ‘initial conditions’ defined as geographic factors (examples in Ballinger 
2008a, Ch. 1) or directly cite geographic factors. The sharp increase in the use of and 
statements that initial conditions are needed in development studies suggests that the 
                                                 
9 Extensive datasets have been developed using historical data from Angus Maddison’s Monitoring 
the World Economy: 1820-1992 (OECD, 1995) and The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective 
(OECD, 2001) as well as research by Philip Curtin, Paul Bairoch and other demographic historians. 
These have been most notably used in the trilogy of highly influential works by Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (and the numerous responses generated by this research): ‘The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’ (2001, American Economic Review), 
‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income 
Distribution’ (2002, Quarterly Journal of Economics), and ‘The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, 
Institutional Change and Economic Growth’ (2005, American Economic Review); see also Rodrik et. 
al. 2002 and Rodrik 2003. 
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trend to endogenize every conceivable factor leads to an explanatory dead-end of 
‘circular endogeneity’.10  
Crucially, this circular endogeneity not only presents a problem for identification 
in econometric models but also for explaining the inherently spatial component of the 
question of uneven development. Many theories of uneven development such as core-
periphery theories, dependency theories, theories of industrial agglomeration, and 
theories based on institutional differences posit some process that causes more 
agglomeration or development in one area and less in another. These seem to offer 
insights into the process of development. But there is a certain circularity to all 
arguments of this nature unless they also offer an explanation for why areas of high 
social capital, good institutions, or an agglomeration or ‘core’ is located where it is. 
For example, in core-periphery theory, why was the historical core not centered over 
Eastern rather than Western Europe? Or over Tajikistan or Mali for that matter? 
Europe could just as easily be the periphery to an Inner Asian or African core as the 
other way around. Core-periphery or dependency theories might explain complex 
relations between core and periphery, but only after assuming the ‘core’ is where it is 
in the real world. They must ultimately address the location of the core to 
meaningfully explain real spatial distributions of development. More recent, subtler 
theories of social capital or agglomeration may appear to overcome this problem 
when they show how local economies are where they are because of influence from 
local institutions or culture. However, these studies only push the question of real-
world location onto other social factors. Why, then, is that local set of institutions or 
culture distributed as it is in the real world? The geographer A.J. Scott recognized this 
problem in the context of theories of high-tech clusters or agglomerations:  
there can be no invocation of a privileged ‘independent variable’ in the form of 
some prior fixed set of local activities or attributes…which are supposed to anchor 
the entire locational process within a more durable spatial matrix. Such a 
                                                 
10 Note that the same problem has been simultaneously recognized in modelling in urban studies: 
‘The problem one quickly faces in developing a simulation model of urban dynamics is that almost 
everything seems to be endogenous. Household location choices, firm location choices, real estate 
development choices, and governmental infrastructure and public service choices all interact 
dynamically.’ (Waddell 2005, 1) 
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procedure would in any case only pose the problem again: What then accounts for 
the geographical pattern of these activities and attributes? (Scott 1984, 25) 
Peter Hall notes critically that this agglomeration-type of explanation of uneven 
development (note the similarity to Przeworski’s observation on exogenous factors 
above) ‘somehow lacks a first cause; it goes endlessly on, reproducing itself, but there 
is no suggestion as to the origins of change, either in the system itself or in its 
locational expression’ (Hall 1998, 295). It seems that for explanations of uneven 
development to avoid circularity they cannot simply be made up of inherently aspatial 
and endogenous variables. They need inherently spatial, independent or exogenous 
factors that anchor aspatial social theories to real world locations/distributions to 
avoid circularity. Only geographic factors can fulfill this role. 
Crucially, however, geographic factors need not be strongly causally implicated in 
social theory. They only serve to anchor larger social processes to real-world 
locations. Their spatial influence need only be relatively small, as it is later amplified 
by the path-dependent nature of development and cumulative causation, which are 
especially relevant in the long time periods involved in the study of uneven 
development.  
Krugman links the concept of exogenous geography and ‘anchoring’ in a clear 
statement of the idea:  
in many cases, aspects of natural geography are able to matter so much not 
because natural features of the landscape are that crucial, but because they 
establish seeds around which self-reinforcing agglomerations crystallize. So it is 
precisely the aspects of the economy that in principle allow history-dependent, 
multiple equilibria stories to be told that in practice give exogenous geography 
such a strong role. (Krugman 1998, 24) 
However, despite explanations as to why the ‘anchoring’ function of exogenous 
geographic factors might be important, as by Krugman, and that explanations are 
unsatisfyingly incomplete without anchoring, as by Scott, Hall, or Przeworski, it is 
deeply ingrained even in those who explicitly study spatial aspects of development 
not to address the issue. For example, Scott and Angel write on industrial 
agglomerations that ‘The main analytical issue here, however is not so much how 
these centers came to be precisely where they are, but how they subsequently grew 
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quite systematically’ (Scott and Angel 1987, 878, emphasis added). Lovering warns 
that ‘Although spatial research is concerned with the local, it should not be devoted to 
tracing geographical particularities for their own sake, although this is a temptation’ 
(1989, 213). More recently economic geographer Ron Martin criticizes a deductive 
process-centered approach, the ‘new’ economic geography - whose models predict 
agglomeration and localization - for being ‘unable to tell us where it actually occurs 
or why in particular places and not in others’ (1999, 388, emphasis in the original). 
He goes on, however, to argue that ‘as economic geographers have repeatedly shown, 
economic processes operate differently in different places…These differences cannot 
be captured in terms of a model’s “initial conditions”, but themselves require 
explanation, not simply on a unique case by case basis, but in terms of more general 
principles of spatial difference’ (Martin 1999, 389). Martin rejects ‘initial conditions’, 
which are often geographic in nature (Ballinger 2008a, Ch. 1), and their real-world 
effects on unique cases and instead argues once again for a focus on ‘general 
principles’. In later work Martin, as others, elides the question of real-world location 
with vague constructions such as ‘Different specific institutional regimes develop in 
different places’ and ‘Once established, such local technological clusters in turn 
generate further specialized local institutional systems’ (Martin 2000, 80, 81, 
emphasis added). Regimes and clusters ‘develop’ and once established ‘generate’ but 
where this occurs in the real world is never accounted for.  
1.2 The proper place of geographic factors: An example concerning colonial 
development  
Being too simplistic was and is a major reason for the rejection of geographic 
factors, i.e., that monocausal explanations based on geographic factors cannot 
possibly have all the explanatory power attributed to them when social outcomes are 
so complex. 
However geographic factors are not proposed here to have direct one-to-one 
relations to the complex patterns of development today. By way of illustration, 
consider Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), which argues that patterns of 
disease causing high mortality rates among colonialists led to the creation of 
‘extractive regimes’. In areas where colonialists could not settle in large numbers 
because of high mortality rates, they instead established an elite whose function was 
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to extract as much wealth as possible for the colonizing power. The elite formed and 
maintained institutions useful for economic extraction and exploitation, and for 
concentration of power among the elite. When these areas of high settler mortality 
gained independence local elites took power, yet they maintained underlying 
institutional structures which have not been conducive to development in the long-
term.  
Thus, in their argument, geographic factors (in this case biogeography) did not 
directly cause poverty, yet distributions of endemic diseases11 had long-term spatial 
effects that are still felt today through the mechanism of inherited poorly functioning 
and corrupt institutional frameworks; this condition has in turn been perpetuated by 
the stark difference in wealth and power between elites and the rest of society. 
Development economist Jeffrey Sachs has termed these types of path dependent 
effects ‘amplifiers’ (Sachs 2000). What is important is to note that these are generally 
not simplistic arguments based on direct effects of geographic factors. This is what 
sets this literature apart from earlier considerations of geographic factors rightly 
rejected for simplistic causal mechanisms. 
Critically, however, what our paper hopes to show is not simply that geographic 
factors can be considered in more sophisticated ways and therefore avoid the criticism 
of over-simplicity, although this is a relevant point. What it is hoped can be shown 
here is that it has not been sufficiently theorized why geographic factors are especially 
salient for understanding uneven development. It is argued that the almost exclusive 
focus on social processes and hence what are ultimately endogenous factors has been 
harmful to the understanding of the real-world location of processes, and that the 
reason for this is that the study of real-world location is a question fundamentally 
different from all others asked in the social sciences (i.e., inherently spatial); because 
of this difference there must be some exogenous spatially privileged independent 
factor invoked to explain where processes occur in the world.  
As example, consider the theory in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
again. It was offered as an example of how more recent theories utilizing geographic 
factors are more subtle than in the past. What is crucial for the argument here, 
                                                 
11 In pre- germ-theory times, spatial patterns of endemic diseases were essentially outside of human 
control; to this day, centuries later, malaria and many other diseases such as dengue fever are still only 
semi-controlled (at best) by socially endogenous factors.  
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however, is the precise role the geographic factor plays in their framework. The 
processes that are important to the theory are extremely complex - the global demand 
for sugar, tobacco, and cotton, political processes that drove European colonization, 
and so on. Yet regardless of the complexities of these processes, what explains their 
spatial distribution is the real spatial distribution of a geographic/environmental 
factor, such as the endemic distribution of malaria. It is argued that there is always a 
‘spatially privileged independent variable’ that can be related to the spatial pattern of 
any given process. Most important for reconceptualizing geographic factors and 
concerns about determinism in social processes, these need not be otherwise strongly 
causally linked in arguments about the related social process.  
When geographic/environmental factors are considered at all, it is precisely the 
over-emphasis on them as strongly and directly causal in the operation of social 
processes that has led to their rejection. For example, Blaut writes: ‘Environmental 
determinism…is the practice of falsely claiming that the natural environment explains 
some fact of human life when the real causes, the important causes, are cultural, not 
environmental’ (Blaut 2000, 149). However, we need not strongly implicate 
geographic factors in a social process, while still being aware of the role they play in 
the distribution of that process. Malaria in no way caused the social processes of 
European expansion, global demand for tropical products, the shipping and 
organizational technology that developed and so on. Yet without considering the real-
world spatial pattern of malaria one could study European politics and economies, 
global demand for tropical products, shipping and organizational technologies and so 
on endlessly in attempting to understanding uneven development, which indeed has 
been done, yet never understand the reason for the real-world spatial pattern these 
complex social processes assumed. On close consideration, this is the situation with 
every social process related to development, at both large and small scales. For this 
reason it is useful to decouple explanations of endogenous social processes from 
spatial influence arising largely exogenously to social processes, disentangling highly 
complex social arguments from what are often fairly direct and understandable spatial 
influences from geographic factors.  
It may help to visualize this idea. McArthur and Sachs 2001 contains a number of 
simple causal diagrams summarizing various development theories (arranged by 
increasing complexity). For example, they summarize Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001 as arguing for causality running from geographic factors, to 
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institutions, and then to development in the first diagram below. (Their entire 
summary constitutes Figure 1 below; the short descriptions are by McArthur and 
Sachs): 
 
 
 
(Example: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001. High disease environment leads to 
predatory state institutions, which impede long-term development) 
 
 
 
(Example: Engerman and Sokoloff, 1994. Tropical Ecozones lead to plantation 
agriculture, which promote the use of slavery, which impedes economic development) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Example: Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999. Adverse geography diminishes agricultural 
productivity and health, thereby directly impeding development. Adverse geography also 
promotes state predation, leading to predatory institutions and poor development) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Example: Sachs, 2000. Adverse geography has direct effects on production, and 
indirect effects via institutions, which both lead low levels of development. In 
turn, low levels of development result in low levels of innovation and slow 
technological change. The pace of endogenous growth is thereby reduced). 
 
Figure 1 McArthur and Sachs 2001, Causal Schemas of Development Arguments 
 
 
Causal diagrams and the theories they represent can of course become far more 
complex. However, the main point we argue here does not revolve around the 
Geography Institutions Development 
Geography Technology Development 
Institutions 
Geography Technology Institutions Development 
Geography Technology Development 
Institutions 
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addition of more boxes or arrows, or arguing for different or more complex 
interrelations between these. Rather, we argue that the questions and answers above 
are framed in a fundamentally wrong way. As long-term factors with often very small, 
sometimes imperceptible year to year influences, geographic influence incrementally 
adds up over decades, centuries, and millennia to anchor social processes in one part 
of the world and not in another. Rather than causal diagrams such as those above, this 
might be diagrammed in the following way: 
 
 
Figure 2 Causal Schema; Endogenous Social, Exogenous Geography Factors  
 
    
Figure 2, rather than showing more factors or greater complexity in their 
interrelations, simply divides factors into exogenous and endogenous. The 
endogenous factors interact in complex ways that are not entirely understood. 
However, the exogenous spatial geographic factors have relatively simple and small 
Spatially 
Variegated 
Cumulative 
Development 
Endogenous  
Exogenous 
Short-Term 
Geographic 
Influences 
Long-Term 
(Cumulative) 
Institutions & 
Human Capital 
Short-Term 
Policy & 
Performance 
Short-Term 
Development (i.e. 
‘Growth’) & 
Human Capital 
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effects through incentives and constraints on individual decisions. Over time, the 
cumulative effect is the amplification of preexisting geographic spatial variation into 
patterns of social variation, the anchoring of social processes to some regions and not 
in others. One of the simplest yet most profound of these effects can be seen in 
urbanization. Historically, millions of individual decisions influenced by factors such 
as transport costs led to the spatial patterns of urban development. These have in turn 
been amplified by subsequent urbanization-related social processes (e.g., institutional 
development) following the earlier urbanization pattern (this idea is developed further 
in Ballinger 2008a, Appendix B). Transport costs, disease patterns, innate agricultural 
potential and other geographic factors have subtly shaped the spatial patterns of 
development over centuries through independently small constraints and incentives 
for individuals but cumulatively large spatial influence on development outcomes. 
1.3   Social scientists and location 
The questions surrounding uneven development, unlike others asked by social 
scientists, are inherently spatial questions. Without some real-world spatial input 
arguments about real-world patterns of development are circular. Surveying social 
science literature one finds that either real-world location/distribution is not accounted 
for at all12 or geographic factors are found to have been relied on in some way.  
In considering the class ‘all examples that can be found in which social scientists 
have attempted concrete explanations of why a process is located or distributed where 
it is’ a surprisingly small number of factors are found to be recurrent. Analyzing what 
these factors are and how they have been used is a useful step towards understanding 
why geographic factors are important, and precisely what role they play in explanation 
(this is part of a wider question on the role of initial conditions in explanation, see 
Ballinger 2008a, chapters 1 and 2).  
                                                 
12 As Harvey notes, ‘economists typically place economic activity on the head of a pin.’  (Harvey, 
2011, 12).  The ‘new’ economic geography associated with Krugman, Fujita and others, in the tradition 
of Christaller, Lösch, Isard and Hotelling, only deals with ‘space’ deductively and in the abstract. Other 
social science research often relies on variegated data, but ignores the fact that the variation stems from 
underlying spatial differences (data from countries, states, regions, counties, Nuts II regions, and what 
are often spatially delimited ethnic or cultural groups); their starting point is the variation, which then 
leads to spatially abstract theoretical discussion.  
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In doing this, evidence from both geographers and other social scientists is 
important, although for different reasons. In the latter case, because social scientists 
and historians do not have any disciplinary ‘core’ leading them towards geographic 
factors, then examples from these disciplines help demonstrate that geographic factors 
must be somehow salient in explanations of real-world location/distributions when 
any factors other than geographic factors might just as well be proposed. In the case 
of geography, geographers since the 1960s have been particularly sensitive to any 
appearance of arguing geographic factors are causal in social outcomes (ideas 
‘discredited amongst geographers for over fifty years’, Pawson and Dovers 2003, 11); 
hence explanations by geographers from about the 1960s on that have geographic 
components are especially interesting as they were presented in spite of acute 
awareness of their controversial nature within geography. 
These examples are not chosen on the basis of being influential or from recent 
scholarship. They are the result of an extensive survey of social science literature 
from the 1960s to the present looking for any cases where a scholar has purposefully 
or inadvertently made some attempt to argue for why some social process is 
distributed in the real world as it is. The goal is a better understanding of why the 
factors chosen were chosen and how they are used.  
Because of the length involved in describing even a small portion of these they are 
appended separately. The appendix is composed of several very briefly described 
examples as well as a few slightly longer discussions. The latter include examples 
from the geographer John Marshall (Ontario, scientific method in geography) and 
Richard Peet (discursive formation of New England). Interestingly, we even ran 
across a short example from the essayist George Monbiot (Ancient Greece, soils and 
social development). The approach to studying regional variation known as ‘new 
regionalism’ or ‘cultural economy’ is also discussed with an example from Alan 
James (high-tech regions, Salt Lake City and Mormon culture). 
II   Geographically grounded explanation, ethics, and society 
Ballinger 2008d discusses ethical concerns by social scientists with determinism 
more generally, many of which are expressed with geographic determinism in mind. 
The aversion to suggesting geographic factors are causal in human affairs is deeply 
embedded in social scientific thought. However, it may be that it is precisely the 
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absence of geographic factors in the analysis of development outcomes that has 
allowed many morally suspect ideas concerning development to linger.  
Ignoring geography means imagining a uniform world with no differentiation in 
physical characteristics (this is usually implicit rather than explicit in the aspatial 
work of much social science). It is hard to imagine by what mechanism 
socioeconomic and cultural variation would arise in a uniform world. In such a world, 
for the millennia that humans have been organizing socially and developing 
culturally, there would be little reason for trade, as there would be no difference in 
access to or types of resources, little reason to migrate or travel, as everywhere would 
be the same, little reason to adapt or innovate any differently than one’s neighboring 
communities. This is the world implicitly assumed when geography is ignored. 
However, in one way or another social scientists and historians do fall back on 
social variation to explain variations in economic and political organization. 
Explanations of differences in material well-being often have at their root the idea that 
either: 
 
1) there is some deficiency in the culture, such as low ‘social capital’ or ‘amoral 
familism’13, or a religion that fails to foster a work ethic, or a lack of 
institutions that internalize externalities and create incentives or 
 
2) the culture is the victim of oppression or exploitation.  
 
These two basic ideas cover the spectrum of right (‘It’s their fault’) and left 
(dependency theories, postcolonialism). Hybrid theories can also be constructed, such 
as blaming a lack of institutions or social capital on some earlier period of oppression 
and exploitation (e.g. Putnam 1993). Nevertheless, all of these ultimately rely on 
social and cultural variation as reasons for political and economic variation, although 
this is not always explicit. That culture is the basis is clear in (1) above. That 
oppression and exploitation in (2) are also based on social variation is perhaps less 
obvious. Yet otherwise, how did the oppressing and exploiting society become 
wealthy or powerful enough to oppress and exploit in the first place? The only answer 
                                                 
13 This refers to Edward Banfield’s groundbreaking 1958 study, often seen as the beginning of the 
modern social capital literature.  
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is that their society varied from others in some aspect of political, military or 
economic organization. Again, it is difficult to imagine how these organizational 
differences arose in a world without variation of geographic factors. 
Contrast the right and left types of explanation with explanations of variation that 
ultimately lie in geography. Because geographical arguments ultimately do not rely on 
social differences, as no one is to blame for geography and very long-term processes, 
they do not logically support the framework of political ideologies or, except in their 
crudest forms, rightly serve political ends. The fact that they have in the past been 
used in these ways reflects on the easy reception of crude ideas and those who 
willfully accepted them, not on the appropriate methodology to arrive at cogent 
explanation. Rather, when the complexities of the amplification of early geographic 
differences into later social patterns are diligently traced they undermine the 
arguments of both left and right because they have as fundamental causes neither 
culture, nor oppression and exploitation.  
The rejection of geographic determinism from ‘left’ perspectives is well-known, 
but the ‘right’ also rejects geographic determinism, objecting to the downplaying - 
inherent in explanations that rely on geographic factors - of the triumphalist view of 
‘Western culture’ as the root cause of development. For example, Victor Davis 
Hanson writes: 
 Jared Diamond’s bestselling Guns, Germs, and Steel argued that geography 
trumped culture, and that the current privileged position of the West was therefore 
mostly attributable to the advantageous resources in, and location of, Western 
countries, rather than to Europe’s singular values. Despite the allure of such a 
politically correct exegesis…there were numerous criticisms of this determinist 
idea of natural accidents resulting in the present-day dominance of the West. 
…Environment, far from being a precondition for Western success, was often 
almost irrelevant to it. (Hanson 2005). 
Regarding determinism14 more generally, the banishment of the concept from the 
modern social sciences is due precisely to the fact that its rejection is one of the few 
areas where both right and left seem to be in agreement. The religious right objects to 
                                                 
14 Determinism however defined; for the purposes here its rejection is the point regardless of how it is 
defined by those rejecting it.  
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determinism (and its twin concept, reductionism, see Wacome 2004) based on beliefs 
that it undermines religion, while they as well as many strands of the social and 
Burkean conservative and classical liberal/libertarian right reject determinism for 
numerous reasons - it undermines the ‘positive liberty’ of Isaiah Berlin, the ‘natural 
law’ central to some conservative positions, and the triumphalist individualism central 
to the traditions associated with F.A. Hayek, for example. The ultimately apolitical 
nature of geographical explanations (properly used) has brought them scorn from 
many political sides, both right and left, and goes far in explaining their absence in 
much modern political and economic literature. Rather than geographic determinism, 
it is precisely subtle ‘uniform world’ assumptions themselves that allow for the 
ongoing left-right dichotomy in the debate on economic and political performance to 
continue.  
Clearly the world is not marked by uniformity. Stemming from still earlier uneven 
antecedent and initial conditions (Ballinger 2008b), the world shows extreme 
variation in every aspect of its climate, altitudes, length of days, angle of sunlight 
(affecting photosynthesis rates), mineral deposits, soil types, wind currents, ocean 
currents, ocean temperatures, ocean salinity, seismic activity, access to navigable 
water, access to fresh water (for irrigation), rainfall intensity, rainfall regularity, 
which all further lead to variation in flora, fauna, different population densities, 
disease patterns, urbanization patterns and the location and activity of cities, trade 
patterns, migration patterns (including human migrations in the past and to some 
extent today) and many, many other variables, shaping incentives and constraints on 
millions of individual decisions over millennia. 
Far from being unethical, observations of different organizational responses to 
highly varied environments clearly demonstrate the genius of all human cultures in 
adapting to limits imposed by geography and seizing unique opportunities presented 
by geography. Ignoring these factors ensures that political and development theories 
remain incapable of fully explaining the inequity of global wealth distribution. More 
dangerous still, it further ensures that evidence needed to refute simplistic cultural and 
racialist ideas of unequal political and economic performance are not developed, 
paradoxically leaving room for those who would blame cultures themselves. 
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2.1  Humanist geography and geographic humanism 
In this time of heightened concern for the environment it may also be wise to 
reflect on the ethical-ecological implications of downplaying the role of ‘the natural’ 
in ‘the social’. The problems this anthropocentric dualism pose to the social sciences 
have been pointed out many times (Worster 1990, Freudenburg 1995, Murphy 1995, 
and Steinberg 2002 are among the better modern examples), and there are 
innumerable strands stemming from Aldo Leopold, Arne Naess and others (e.g., bio- 
and eco-regionalism, deep ecology), as well as far older strands within geography 
(from George Perkins Marsh back to Humboldt and Herder). As the geographer 
Donald Meinig noted, geography is in this sense an inherently ecologically oriented 
and philosophical enterprise. ‘Geography has sometimes been represented as a kind of 
moral philosophy, primarily in the sense that those who have a deep fascination for 
the earth needs must have a special concern for the care of the earth.’ (Meinig 1992, 
para. 40).  
Understanding the human impact on the environment has become a central 
concern, with geography especially well-placed to be central in this endeavor. ‘An old 
definition of geography has been coming back into favor: the study of the Earth as the 
Home of Man—or, as we now say, of Humankind. We have recently become aware 
that the Earth as Home is in alarming condition, and geographers, like many others, 
are eager to tackle urgent problems of home repair and of remodeling the way we 
live’ (Meinig 1992, para. 40). 
Yet the human-environment basis of geography is still deeper, the connection 
between human and Earth more fundamental than just the self-serving pragmatic 
concern with not fouling our own nest. Not only does ethical concern for the 
environment come from a more immediate connection with the Earth, but through a 
better understanding of the very longest-term interplay between humans and the 
Earth. (An emphasis purely on the ‘environmental’ by some ‘deep ecologists’, 
however, while forgetting humans are a part of nature as well can become a kind of 
‘anti’ humanism, as famously argued in Bookchin 1987; similarly an emphasis on 
ecoregionalism, like many ideologies, can be perverted; see Olsen 1999). Our 
emphasis here, however, has not been to argue for a particular environmental ethics, 
but for a clearer understanding of the need for geographic factors in explanation. 
Works such as Pomeranz 2000 and Davis 2002 demonstrate that while avoiding 
 18 
unethical forms geographic factors can be used in causal explanation in ways that 
seem to offer significant insight into social outcomes. 
As Meinig observes on the relatively modern concern for human impact on the 
environment, ‘I have no practical skills to put to use on such projects. I can only add 
my small voice to the few urging the need, as well, for a much longer perspective on 
such matters, a far better understanding of how we got to where we are. And that sort 
of historical investigation must surely lead to a sobering meditation on the human 
situation on this earth’ (Meinig 1992, para. 40). From the long perspective, the Earth 
has shaped humans far more than humans have shaped the Earth. An understanding of 
this, of how we got to where we are, leads to an appreciation of the human-land 
connection still deeper than short-term and merely pragmatic concerns about the 
environment. 
 
A note on geographers and geography 
 
Geographers, like the mythical giant Anteus, derive their strength from contact with the earth  
Hart 1982, 24 
 
Geographers especially seem to fear being associated with ‘simplistic’ 
explanations based on geographic factors, of being identified with nothing more than 
‘neocolonial gazetteering, capes and bays, world capitals, and the socio-ecological 
determinism of National Geographic television specials’ (Eliot Hurst 1985, 72). This 
attitude became so widespread within human geography that Stoddart complained that 
‘Geographers have forgotten—it is extraordinary to have to say so—that some parts 
of the Earth are high, others low; some wet, others dry; some desert, others covered 
by forest and grassland and ice’ (Stoddart 1987, 331). This has been the case since at 
least the mid-1960s, when Morgan and Moss could already write of geography that 
‘In a study which claims to attach so much importance to the relationships between 
man and physical environment, the neglect of soil, human nutrition, and disease is 
extraordinary’ (Morgan and Moss 1965, 340). Susan Hanson, in ‘Healing the Rift 
Between the Nature-Society and Space-Society Traditions in Human Geography’ 
(1999) asks ‘Why did geographers think they could arrive at useful generalizations 
only by erasing nature? Some geographers see the answers to these questions in 
embarrassment over the discipline’s earlier excesses of environmental determinism, 
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i.e., that geography’s previous bout with generalization had so prominently featured 
the role of the physical environment that geographic theory could regain credibility 
only by rejecting environment outright (Abler 1987; Fitzsimmons 1989; Kates 1987)’ 
(Hanson 1999, 136). 
The political economist Samir Amin (1976, 10) ‘dismissed geography as having 
failed to answer its basic problematic—the relationship between the social formation 
and its natural environment’ (in Salih 1984, 79), a ‘failure’ that was of course 
purposefully brought about as geographers moved away from influence of the latter 
on the former.  Richard Hartshorne, an important figure in this movement in the 
1940s, nevertheless concluded:  
In no small part, the ultimate goal of geography is to provide scientific description 
of the way in which the originally unorganized areas of the earth are organized 
into various kinds of functioning regions (Hartshorne 1960, 53).  
Similarly, on the evolution of social variation, Carl Sauer states that ‘One of the 
fundamental questions in all social study is how to account for the rise and loss of 
institutions and civilizations’ (Sauer 1940). Although Sauer is also viewed as one of 
the central figures in the move away from explanation of social outcomes using 
geographic factors15 he clearly saw variation in social organization as resulting from 
variation in the natural environment:  
                                                 
15 Both Hartshorne and Sauer are considered foundational in the move of geography to views that 
were ‘a complete reversal of environmental determinism’ (Castree et. al. 2005, 134). 
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The culture area, as a community with a way of living, is therefore a growth on a 
particular ‘soil’ or home, an historical and geographical expression. Its mode of 
living, economy, or Wirtschaft, is its way of maximizing the satisfactions it seeks 
and of minimizing the efforts it expends. That is perhaps what adaptation to 
environment means (Sauer 1940).16 
However, since Sauer wrote in the 1940, as Stoddart and Hanson emphasize, there 
has been an almost complete withdrawal by geographers from social questions that 
might involve geographic or environmental influence on society. This paper works 
from the perspective that these questions concerning the long-term development of 
society should properly be in the realm of geography as much or more than any other 
discipline, and that reclaiming this area of study in, addition to human impacts on the 
environment, is one way of further uniting geography around a central human-land 
theme as well as improving its academic status and visibility to the public.17  
B.L. Turner asks ‘If geographers find simplistic the spatial claims of Krugman 
(1997) and Sachs (e.g. Gallup and Sachs 1999) or the human-environment notions of 
Landes (1999) and Diamond (1997), we might wish to pause and reflect on at least 
two questions. Why does geography repeatedly abdicate powerful ideas developed or 
nurtured within its ranks, abandoning them for rediscovery and reinvention by other 
fields of inquiry? Why are these reinventions, despite our labeling them simplistic and 
even erroneous, taken seriously by the academy and public at large…?’ (Turner 
2002b, 428). Reviewing Diamond (2005) Ron Johnston similarly observes that ‘As a 
late interloper he has stolen our ground, presenting a wide audience with the sort of 
book that we are forever bemoaning that geographers should but do not write…He is 
getting geography a public profile for us’ (Johnston 2007, 410). We would argue that 
                                                 
16 Sauer’s language suggests incentives and constraints are, cumulatively, the cause behind social 
adaptation, language similar to both modern evolutionary and economistic approaches to the study of 
society. Decades later economic historian Douglass North echoes Sauer, stating that ideological 
differences ‘emerged primarily from the diverse geographic experiences of groups contending with 
their environments and evolved into different languages, religions, customs, and traditions’ (1982, 
209).  
17 Numerous modern geographers have argued for an increase in attention to human-environment 
interaction in various ways (e.g., Guelke 1989), but seldom for the use of geographical factors in the 
explanation of social outcomes. 
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the inherently satisfying nature of explanations that break the circularity of aspatial 
endogenous factors is precisely the reason work such as Diamond’s has been well 
received by non-geographers. Properly used, and in light of a better understanding of 
the role of geographic factors in explaining spatial distributions and in the 
understanding of contingent local, context-dependent outcomes, geographic factors 
can be integrated into the study of society; indeed, they have an indispensable role in 
grounding aspatial social theories in the real world.    
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
As mentioned in section 1.3, it is useful to consider as a class examples where some 
explanation is given for why a social process is located or distributed as it is in the 
real world. In doing so the possible factors can be observed (section A.1). Section A.2 
discusses these further with a final note on ‘cultural economy’ approaches to regional 
variation.   
 
A.1 Post 1960s examples where explanation of real-world location is 
attempted 
 
Attempts to anchor social theories to real-world locations (rather than beginning with 
variation and studying it or discussing theory aspatially) are relatively few considered 
as a percentage of the vast social science literature. But of course given this vastness 
there are nevertheless numerous examples.  
 
A.1.1  Examples in the social sciences outside of geography 
 
Migration is often of central importance in explanations of regional variation and is 
frequently related by scholars to the push or pull of some environmental factor(s) such 
as soil quality or climate change. For example, the specialist in empires, Richard 
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Drayton, summarizing reasons for imperial expansion, so important to understanding 
many spatial patterns of modern society, writes ‘The demand for [foreign resources], 
and thus the lunge outwards of Vikings, or Spanish hidalgos, or Zulus, may be the 
expression of some new environmental pressures, population surges, agrarian crises, 
ages of ice or drought’ (Drayton 2004, 19).  
The economist Charles Kindleberger (1978) cites a number of historical accounts of 
political and economic variation that rely on underlying variations of agricultural 
potential. The relevance and historical breadth of his examples make an extended 
quote worthwhile:  
 Ricardo made clear long ago that not all land is equally productive. Rich land that 
earned large rents to be captured by the aristocracy in whole or in part was 
matched at the other end of the spectrum by no-rent land that was unable to 
support nobility. Weber observed that in ancient Greece land in the plain 
accumulated in the hands of nobles, while the hillsides that could not produce a 
rent were everywhere held by the peasantry. Braudel made similar observations of 
the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages, noting that mountains made for 
democracy, while plains were suited to the aristocratic form of 
government…Differences among nobles also frequently related to the quality of 
the soil. The Junkers in the north and east of Germany were originally relatively 
poor and knew how to milk; in Bavaria, nobility did not undertake farm work. 
…In southern Germany—Türingerwald, South Mecklenberg and the 
Schwarzwald—there were no nobles because the soil was thin and a surplus could 
be acquired only from extensive holdings….Joseph Marshall, a British civil 
servant traveling through Germany in the eighteenth century, noted ‘It is always to 
be remarked that the gradations of freedom are ever to be found in mountainous 
countries; in general such are free; but even under absolute monarchs they enjoy 
more liberty than the subjects of the same prince who inhabit plain countries…’ 
…Rappard examined the topography of Switzerland with its separate cantons 
prior to confederation in 1848 and found democracies in the poor Alpine districts 
(Uri, Schwyz, Unterwald, Zug, Glaris, Appenzell), patrician aristocracies in the 
plains, corporative oligarchies in commercial cities, and an assortment of 
monarchies and aristocracies, ecclesiastical and secular, absolute and qualified in 
mixed cases (Kindleberger 1978, 168-169). 
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Remarkably, these associations of soil type to socioeconomic organization observed 
long ago find support in similar modern geological research, described here by the 
essayist George Monbiot:  
Professor Greg Retallack [geology] has spent much of the past few years taking 
soil samples from the sites of the temples of ancient Greece. He has stumbled on a 
remarkable phenomenon. There is a strong link, challenged by only a few 
exceptions, between the identity of the god worshipped at a particular temple and 
the temple’s location. Where Artemis or Apollo were celebrated, the soil was of a 
kind called a lithic xerept, where montane scrub suitable only for nomadic herders 
grows. Nomads living on soils called xeralfs, by contrast, worshipped Hera and 
Hermes. Subsistence farmers cultivating soils called rendolls built temples to 
Demeter and Dionysos, while fluvent soils capable of supporting large farms lie 
beneath shrines to Hestia, Hephaistos and Ares. The gods of ancient Greece, 
Professor Retallack suggests, “came not from an imaginary poetic city on Mt. 
Olympus, but personify ancient local lifestyles.” The ancients were worshipping 
their own means of subsistence. (Monbiot 2005 on Retallack 2003, similar 
research later published as Retallack 2008) 
Monbiot even constructs his own theory on this research. ‘My untested hypothesis is 
as follows. The peculiarities of the Abrahamic religions – their astonishing success in 
colonising the world and their dangerous notion of progress (now inherited by secular 
society) – result from a marriage between the universal god of the nomads and the 
conditions which permitted cities to develop. The dominant beliefs of the past 2000 
years are the result of an ancient migration from soils such as xerepts and xeralfs to 
soils such as fluvents and rendolls.’ (Monbiot 2005) 
These are not isolated examples. The research of economists, political scientists, 
anthropologists, and historians is usually either aspatial discussion of some social 
process, or takes as given the underlying spatial variation in social data. However, 
when linking these processes to a real-world location or distribution is attempted there 
is some underlying spatially varying geographic/environmental factor ultimately 
relied upon in some way.  
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A.1.2 Examples from Geographers 
 
An example similar to those above is found in an observation on immigration to 
the United States by two physical geographers researching variations in soil fertility: 
Each wave of pioneers had to choose a place to settle, often without clear 
guidelines. Reports of successes and failures were passed on to newcomers, who 
used the information to help them choose their land…Immigrants to New England 
were advised to find level and stone-free fields; those crossing the Appalachians 
told each other that nut trees grew on the soils that would prove best for crops; 
Southern planters were attracted by the dark soils of the Alabama Black Belt; 
migrants to central Kentucky took a decade to learn to discriminate between the 
Outer Bluegrass and the topographically similar but less fertile Eden Shale hills; 
in Michigan and Illinois, settlers discovered that treeless soils were not necessarily 
barren; in the Plains States, they found ways to live without a nearby woodlot; and 
in Wyoming, access to easily transported water proved to be more important than 
the texture of the soil. In time, Americans learned some basic rules about land 
evaluation in each part of this vast continent…Those early decisions about the 
quality of land were fraught with danger, because a bad choice could mean 
starvation (Gersmehl and Brown 1986, 480).   
An example anchoring a posited social process relying on migration, soil types and 
other geographic factors is by the geographer John Marshall. He seeks to give a clear 
example of how geographers use the scientific method for explanation in The Future 
of Geography (1985). The theory Marshall considers is that population density is a 
function of the number of opportunities in an area for earning a livelihood. Areas of 
agricultural surplus should be more densely populated and the theory ‘can be further 
developed by noting that areas of productive farmland also support market towns, and 
that these same areas, being well peopled, are more likely to attract manufacturing 
industries than districts where population is sparse. The growth of towns and 
manufacturing will lead to an even higher level of population density’ (Marshall 
1985, 125). 
The causes of the population distribution in Ontario are in part due to the normal 
gradient of decreasing rural population from south to north in northern latitudes 
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corresponding to agricultural productivity. Another key factor is the low productivity 
of soils on the Canadian Shield: ‘Most of northern Ontario lies on the Canadian 
Shield, an extensive area of Precambrian rock which was largely stripped bare of soil 
by the action of continental ice sheets during the Pleistocene glaciations. Southern 
Ontario, in contrast, was a region of glacial deposition rather than erosion, and here 
the soils are capable of supporting prosperous farms’ (Marshall 1985, 125). 
By using the methods Marshall proposes, the soil and latitude combinations of 
Ontario accurately predict the relative populations of fifty of the fifty three 
administrative districts of Ontario. The three areas that do not match the prediction of 
the theory are a southern administrative area, Manitoulin Island, that has lower than 
the predicted population and two northern areas, Muskoka and the Sudbury Basin, 
that have higher than expected populations. Marshall’s main point is to show that 
anomalies do not overturn theory; the three anomalies are thus explained: The 
relatively low population of Manitoulin Island is due, suggests Marshall, to its 
(transport related) isolation, the higher than expected population of Muskoka is due to 
its status as a resort area, and of the Sudbury Basin because it has one of the world’s 
richest concentrations of nickel and copper and hence a large mining community. 
Thus the unexpectedly high population of the Sudbury Basin is directly explained by 
the exogenous factor of the location of minerals. There are social dimensions to the 
anomalies of Manitoulin Island and Muskoka, such as the location of land and water 
transport routes, and in the case of Muskoka, the aesthetic values of society. 
Crucially, however, these are spatially anchored by the exogenous geographic factors 
of the real-world location of the lakes and waterfalls of Muskoka and their proximity 
to Toronto, and the relevant land and water transport routes themselves likely have 
important geographic determinants as well. 
Marshall has chosen a single example, thus presumably his best, to show how to 
answer a question about the real-world distribution of a theorized social process in 
Ontario, Canada. All of Marshall’s factors, including those that explain anomalies, 
turn out to be related to real-world variation in environmental and geographic 
conditions. 
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The ubiquity of anchoring 
 
Even approaches not usually associated with an emphasis on causal argumentation 
anchor their ideas with geographic factors to the extent they are anchored at all. For 
example, since immigration and soil were both considered together above, consider a 
‘hermeneutic’ point of view taken by Peet (1997). ‘The Cultural Production of 
Economic Forms’ discusses the development of the ‘New England discursive 
formation’. One finds that the location of this process is anchored by the conjuncture 
of immigration18 and (a shared view of) a particular local environment that marks the 
boundaries of a shared, if imagined economy. Peet cites one New Englander who 
describes ‘the rock bound region of New England’ and the stories these people tell 
about themselves are shaped by what Peet describes as ‘a glaciated land where winter 
lasts fiercely for five months, and intermittently for seven months of the year’ (40). 
The social process of discursive formation Peet discusses is anchored spatially in the 
conjuncture of particular immigrants in an area of a particular soil structure and 
climate. Even in this very different type of geography (citing Foucault, Castoriadis, 
Habermas, and Bourdieu), if there is any spatial anchoring at all it is based on the 
familiar categories of migration and local geographic factors. 
 
A.2  Origins and diffusion 
 
The geographer Donald Meinig is an exception among many post-1960s 
geographers in that he explicitly set out to explain real-world patterns of social 
phenomena rather than only describe them or utilize them as data in social theory. On 
how to go about doing so Meinig observes: 
we must ask two fundamental questions: (1) why do major cultural patterns and 
movements begin where they do (the problem of the ‘culture hearth’), and (2) how 
do they spread to other peoples and areas (a problem of spatial diffusion)? 
(Meinig 1978, 1189) 
                                                 
18 In particular, the expansion of international Calvinism ‘brought the Dutch to New Amsterdam 
(later New York), French Huguenots to New York, South Carolina and Massachusetts, Scottish 
Presbyterians to the Middle Colonies, and the Puritans from England through the Netherlands to New 
England in 1620’ (Peet,1997, 40).    
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In the examples above from economists, historians, and geographers one can see 
the importance of factors related to variation in agricultural productivity and the 
importance of migration. Further examples link spatial variation in agricultural 
productivity, transport costs, and biogeography—via intermediate spatial variation in 
population density, urbanization, and institutions—to more recent economic and 
political variation.   
 
A.2.1   Long-term development of social variation 
 
We have already seen some examples of diffusion (through migration, e.g., 
Drayton’s emphasis on cultural spread from imperialism, Peet on immigration etc.). 
This brings us to Meinig’s other factor, the ‘culture hearth’ and the longer term 
questions of origins of cultural variation.  
The work that is illuminating the longest-term origins of patterns of cultural 
variation has often been (because of its extraordinary complexity) a multidisciplinary 
collaboration of archaeologists, historical sociologists, linguists, and anthropologists, 
with, for example, promising collaborations between biologists and linguists in 
mapping genes and languages. Examples of the latter include Barbujani and Bertorelle 
(2001) tracing the origins of European cultural variation, Bamshad, Kivisild, Watkins 
et. al., (2001) tracing the ancient ethnic roots of Indian castes, or Gresham, Morar, 
Underhill et. al. (2001) on the origins and spread of the Roma. Rogers et. al. (1991) 
trace the origins of linguistic variation in native North Americans to the 
biogeographic variation caused by Ice Age refugia of flora and fauna. These 
collaborations, many of which unashamedly cite geographic factors as causal in their 
explanations of geographic distributions, are finally shedding light on the very 
longest-term origins of social variation, on geography’s old questions on ‘culture 
hearths’. Eventually, tying the discoveries of these research areas to the cultural and 
institutional variation at the root of many economic and geographic theories promises 
more intuitively satisfying, non-circular explanations of these questions. While 
beyond the scope of the present work, consideration of these possibilities is 
increasingly realizable and a promising direction for future research.  
Variation in urbanization and institutional or political development are tied to 
underlying geographical factors in numerous ways. One important factor, for 
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example, is the spatial variation of population. Spatial variation in population density 
is thought to be closely related to various underlying factors such as:  
• spatial variations in transport costs (see Ballinger 2008a, Appendix B).  
• geographic factors related to agricultural productivity (Pounds and Roome 
1971; Luck 2007)  
• continental physiography and climate (Small and Cohen 2004)  
Spatial variation in population density in turn underlies subsequent spatial 
variation in more complex aspects of society. For example, Goldstone 1992 associates 
patterns of Eurasian population change with waves of Eurasian revolutions and 
political development. Technological invention has been associated with high 
population levels (Kremer 1993; Klasen and Thorsten 2006; Algaze 2005 and 2010 
associate population density with the development of increasing returns industries and 
institutional development even in ancient societies). Regions of historically high 
population densities are associated with less income inequality today, (Sylwester 
2003), perhaps because institutions related to dealing with large populations were 
conducive to the development of ‘good’ institutions.  
Spatial variation in transport costs also influenced spatial patterns of trade with 
profound social and institutional consequences. Areas with high levels of trade 
experienced the demographic transition earlier and differently than areas with low 
levels of trade, with the effect of strongly amplifying the development differences 
between areas of high and low industrialization and locking very high population 
areas into unskilled labor-intensive industries (Galor and Mountford 2008). 
Furthermore, the variations in agricultural productivity and transport costs were 
central to subsequent patterns of urbanization—literally the ‘civilization’ so central to 
institutional, social and cultural development. Ballinger 2008a, Appendix B expands 
on this relationship; also see Bairoch 1988 and van der Woude, Hayami, and De Vries 
1990). 
 
A.2.2   A note on ‘new regionalism’/‘cultural economy’ and regional variation  
One branch of economic geography is especially concerned with regional 
variation, particularly high-tech clusters, because they are often viewed as central to 
modern economic development. We turn to this now because the type of geography 
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that has developed to study these regions, with an intense focus on regional 
institutions and culture, might seem to explain spatial variation without reliance on 
geographical factors.  
Within (especially British) geography various related approaches—‘new 
regionalism’ and ‘institutional geography’ (Amin 1999) and more recently ‘cultural 
economy’ (see Amin and Thrift 2003 for examples and an overview)—have been 
popular in the study of regional variation. Similar to and in part developing from the 
‘CURS’ (Changing Urban and Regional Systems) project in the United Kingdom and 
work associated with Doreen Massey and the ‘localities project’ in the 1980s (Massey 
1978, 1979, Cox 1992) cultural economy and new regionalist approaches are based on 
largely qualitative, intensive methods (that is, focused on small regions rather than 
extensive or international comparisons), where institutional or cultural differences 
between regions are studied to understand how these lead to different regional 
outcomes. Like the intensive work associated with Doreen Massey and the ‘localities 
project’ the detailed nature of cultural economy might give the impression that real 
world location/distributions are being explained. However, although this research may 
usefully show in greater detail mechanisms of micro-macro interactions (micro-macro 
integration has likewise been considered a major yet unachieved goal among 
economists), these types of studies explain spatial distributions of socioeconomic 
factors through reliance on the spatial distributions of other endogenous cultural and 
institutional factors, and thus do not resolve the problem of circular endogeneity.  
Some geographers have noted the logical problems that inattention to cultural and 
institutional development present for explanation. Gertler observes that ‘proponents of 
[social and cultural arguments] have adopted a surprisingly unsophisticated 
understanding of how culture is formed and changes over time’ (Gertler 1997, 51) and 
cites Sayer and Walker (1992) that ‘culture is often misrepresented as something 
ethereal and eternal, divorced from historical material practice’ (178). Perhaps Gertler 
comes closest to voicing the concern that if spatial (regional, national) variation in 
culture or institutions is used to ‘explain’ spatial variation or regional differences in 
economic outcomes, then a full explanation also entails an understanding of the 
origins of the variation in culture itself: It is ‘important to consider the provenance of 
the very institutions which we have implicated as having so much power to shape 
corporate and regional practices….[and] not to treat institutions as if they were 
“carved in stone” or inherited from on high’ (Gertler 1997, 57) and ‘while it is 
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important to assert that cultural characteristics are much more than “mere 
epiphenomenona,” it is also important to examine the process by which cultures are 
actively produced and reproduced by social practices and institutions over time’ 
(Gertler 1997, 51). A critical difference here from Gertler, however, is that Gertler 
views institutions as created and changing significantly in the short term (‘produced 
and reproduced’). Yet it is precisely this view that has been called into question by 
studies that show the resilience of social and institutional patterns over the very long-
term (e.g., Sowell 1996, 1998). As Ron Martin states: ‘By their very nature 
institutions are characterized by inertia and durability…Institutions are characterized 
by “path dependence,” that is they tend to evolve incrementally in a self-reproducing 
and continuity preserving way’ and ‘institutions are therefore important “carriers of 
history” ’ (Martin 2000, 80). 
Cultural economy arguments on culture and institutions sometimes seem to argue 
that culture ‘causes’ institutions (‘produce and reproduce’), other times that 
institutions cause culture. Gertler says ‘I have endeavoured to show how traits and 
attitudes we commonly understand as being part and parcel of inherited cultures are 
themselves produced and reproduced over time by day-to day practices that are 
strongly conditioned by surrounding social institutions and regulatory regimes’ 
(Gertler 1997, 55). This is surely true, but still does not explain the spatial variation of 
social institutions and regulatory regimes. The process of influence between culture 
and institutions seems inseparable, with both affecting each other from their very 
origins. The only way to account for the spatial variation in these seems to demand at 
some point spatially varying exogenous factors. 
An example is the study of the regional economy of Salt Lake City in James 
(2003), a good representative of the cultural economy approach to regional 
development differences. Like Saxenian (1994) and Gertler (1997), James shows 
ways culture affects a regional economy, in this case Mormon culture vis-à-vis 
business practice and innovation in Salt Lake City. He demonstrates that in the 
context of the existing high tech cluster in Salt Lake City there is a set of shared social 
practices, norms and values that cause the Salt Lake City cluster to perform 
differently than other high tech clusters, and more importantly, in detail how 
mechanisms of cause and effect operate. 
James (2003) shows that in part the wider pattern of regional economic 
performance in the western United States is shaped in one area by an underlying set of 
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pluralistic social practices, shared norms, and values; it goes a long way towards 
clarifying how, precisely, these shape that area. But the area itself, the reason for the 
underlying spatial pattern of pluralistic sets of social practices and shared norms and 
values, is not addressed at all. As such this does not, nor is meant to, explain the 
spatial variation in the wider regional economy. However, problems arise when these 
type of explanations are thought of, because of their ever greater detail, as somehow 
resolving the problem of circular endogeneity. 
While no explanation can ever be complete, an understanding of the spatial pattern 
of regional variation would likely include consideration of factors related to the 
development of Mormon ideals, and since these did not occur in the Salt Lake City 
area, then the factors in the region where they did develop. Also important is an 
understanding of the cultures of the points of origin of immigrants to Salt Lake City, 
and the early opportunities and restraints of endowments on development in Salt Lake 
City. Key considerations would likely include both the origin of sets of social 
practices and reasons for the growth of particular kinds of industries in certain areas. 
Where migration has been central to the formation of the existing population in a 
region, reasons for this migration are also a factor, and the cultural characteristics of 
the region must at least to some degree be sought in the culture of the point of origin 
of the immigrants (Sowell 1996, 1998; see also Olson 1996). 
For example, the origins of Mormon culture are in some sense understandable, 
with roots in a specific set of circumstances that led not just to Mormonism but to an 
unusually high number of new religions and political movements, some similar to 
early Mormonism, including in details such as polygamy. Consider that in the same 
region of New York and time period that saw the development of Mormon ideas (this 
account of western New York State is adapted from Lane [2003] and related World 
Book [1997] articles):  
• the prophet Handsome Lake led the Seneca to found a renewed version of the 
traditional Longhouse religion  
• radical Shaker communities flourished in the region 
• a visionary ‘Quakerism’ of ‘Universal Friends’ was founded in Penn Yan, 
New York 
• ‘New Age’ religion in the United States (and the popular idea of the 
‘séance’) traces its roots to the followers of the Fox sisters in Rochester; to 
this day one of the world’s largest ‘Spiritualist Communities’ is in Lilydale, 
near Rochester 
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• the Chautauqua Methodist revivals became renowned throughout the region 
(and to this day) 
• the Oneida Community flourished from 1848, including the practice of 
‘complex marriage’, a form of polygamy  
• Frederick Douglass, a former slave instrumental in the abolition of slavery 
and black rights, wrote and distributed his (radical for its time) newspaper, 
The North Star in Rochester 
• the Underground Railroad stopped in Seneca Falls, where the first Women's 
Rights Convention was also held and Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. 
Anthony founded the American suffragist and feminism movements. 
 
It is hard to imagine that this high spatial concentration of radical social and 
religious ideas was entirely random. There seems to have been something in this 
particular region and time period promoting rapid change, often thought to be related 
to the construction and opening of the Erie canal and the rapid social and economic 
change it entailed. 
Just as the roots of Mormonism seem to be grounded in exceptional local 
circumstances, so too the roots of industry in Salt Lake City. Early on copper mining 
and a chemical industry were important; the area still has the largest open-pit copper 
mine in North America in nearby Bingham Canyon which saw large scale mining 
from 1906 (growing quickly in the first world war) and Great Salt Lake itself was and 
still is ‘mined’ for chlorides, magnesium, and potash, and is responsible for the early 
and ongoing chemical industry in the area. These in turn are largely what led to the 
military investment in the area in the Second World War and subsequent military 
investment similar to that which has been crucial to the Los Angeles, San Diego, San 
Francisco Bay, and Boston area high tech clusters.  
The development of Salt Lake City’s current sets of social practices, values and 
norms also lies in Northwest Europe and the conditions conducive to the emigration 
of the Germans, English, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Scots and Welsh that came to 
make up a large part of the Utah Mormon community and the shared values and 
norms of Utah. The geographically focused, non-random process continues with the 
Tongans, Samoans, Guamanians, Fijians, and Tahitians that have more recently 
emigrated to Utah – what are the conditions that have led to acceptance of 
Mormonism in Polynesia, their emigration, and what effects will this new group have 
on Mormon culture? (The Salt Lake Tribune. 2000. ‘The Polynesians of Utah: 
Islanders' dreams meet cold reality in Utah’. June 12). The point is, all of these social 
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processes, although themselves extremely complex, are spatially anchored to real-
world locations and distributions by relatively straightforward linkages to 
geographical factors. 
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